Abstract
INTRODUCTION
Despite the fact that official development assistance for health has increased dramatically over the last few years, there has been limited improvement in health outcomes in low and middle income countries. 1, 2, 3 One reason is that health worker productivity and morale is low, often plagued by absenteeism. 4 One promising intervention to improve worker productivity is pay for performance (P4P), [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] which provides incentives in the form of bonuses to providers for improvements in utilization and quality of care indicators. P4P can affect health care in two ways; first by incentivizing providers to put more effort into specific activities, and second by increasing the amount of resources available to finance the delivery of services. Despite the promise of P4P, there is little rigorous evidence on its impact in middle and low-income countries, and none that separates out the effect of incentives from increased resources. 10 This study examines the impact of P4P on maternal and child health services in Rwanda, one of the poorest countries in the world. 11 Rwanda has made remarkable progress in improving health since the 1994 genocide. 12 This study uses data produced from a prospective quasiexperimental evaluation design nested into the P4P program rollout. Not only is this among the first rigorous evaluations of P4P in a low-income setting, it is the first to isolate the impact of P4P incentives from the associated increase in resources.
METHODS
In 2005, based on positive field reports from pilot NGO P4P schemes, the Government of Rwanda (GoR) decided to implement a national P4P scheme to supplement primary health care centers' input-based budgets with bonus payments based on the quantity and quality of key services. 13 The scheme pays for 14 maternal and child healthcare output indicators (Box 1).
Some of these indicators are reasons for the visit, such as prenatal care or delivery, while others are services provided during the visit, such as giving the tetanus vaccine during prenatal care.
The Ministry of Health (MoH) defined these indicators and payments based on health priorities, available budget and the previous NGO experience. 13, 14 Facilities report their monthly indicators to the district P4P steering committee responsible for authorizing payment. For the referral indicators, the facility must also submit verification from the hospital that the referral was appropriate and the referred patient was treated. The committee verifies the reports by sending auditors to the facilities on a quarterly basis on an unannounced randomly chosen day. The auditors review the utilization registry and facility records to verify the data reported is the same as the data recorded in facility records. A comparison of facility records with face-to-face interviews of a random sample of patients reported very little false reporting. 16 The facility's overall quality enters the payment formula as a multiplicative factor that raises or lowers the payment for all outputs. The quality index is bounded between zero and one.
If the facility meets all of the quality criteria, then the index equals one and the facility receives full payment for the Box 1 services. However, if the facility is deficient in some of the quality criteria, then all of the payments are discounted. For example, if the facility only scores 0.80 on the quality index, then it only receives 80 percent of the payment for the P4P services.
The facility's overall quality is measured as an index of both structural and process measures of quality of care for various types of services (Box 2). 15 Structural measures are the extent to which the facility has the equipment, drugs, supplies and personnel necessary to deliver a specific service, while process measures capture the clinical content of care provided for specific services. The structural and process indicators are based on the Rwandan clinical practice guidelines. 13, 14 The quality indicators in Box 2 are assessed through the regular monitoring system, in which district hospitals monitor and supervise the quality of health centers in their districts.
Every quarter, supervisors from the district hospital visit each facility on an unannounced randomly chosen day, and assess quality indicators through direct observation and review of patient records. At the end of the visit, they discuss their findings with the facility's personnel, and provide recommendations to improve quality of services. In P4P districts, information from the visit is used to compute each facility's overall quality score.
P4P payments go directly to facilities and are used at each facility's discretion. In the sample of 80 treatment facilities in the study, the P4P payments increased average overall expenditures by 22 percent. On average, facilities allocated 77 percent of the P4P funds to increase personnel compensation, amounting to a 38 percent increase in staff salaries.
Experimental Design
The evaluation design took advantage of the phased implementation of the program at the district level over a 24-month period. Administrative districts with pre-existing NGO P4P schemes were excluded from the sampling frame. The remaining districts were then grouped into 8 pairs based on similar characteristics for rainfall, population density, and predominant livelihoods using data from the 2002 Census. One side of each pair was then randomly assigned into the treatment group and the other into the comparison group.
Just before implementation of the baseline survey, the administrative district boundaries were redrawn in the context of a decentralization effort. 17 As a result, some of the experimental areas were combined with areas that already had the NGO P4P schemes. Because P4P could not be "removed" from health facilities that were already implementing the system, the GoR required that all facilities within those new districts be reassigned to treatment. This led the evaluation team to switch the assignment of treatment and comparison for two of the eight pairs.
As a result, 166 of Rwanda's 401 primary care facilities were included in the study.
The facilities in the treatment group started receiving P4P in 2006, while the facilities in the comparison group continued with input-based financing for an additional 24 months. P4P
was implemented in treatment districts over a 5-month period, yielding a minimum 18-month exposure period. Since a primary objective of the evaluation was to isolate the P4P incentive effect separately from the effect of an increase in financial resources, it was necessary to hold the level of resources constant across treatment and comparison facilities. To accomplish this, comparison facilities' input-based budgets were increased by the average amount of P4P payments to treatment facilities on a quarterly basis during the 24-month treatment window.
We conducted a baseline survey and a follow-up survey 24 months later of the 166 facilities, as well as a random sample of 13 households living in each facility's catchment area.
For the household sample, we first sampled 13 zones (each with approximately 15-20 households) from each facility's official list of zones in their catchment area. We then physically listed all households in the sampled zones and randomly selected one household with at least one child under 6 years old from each zone. This sample size is large enough to estimate program effects of at least 30% in the number of prenatal care visits and the probability of an institutional delivery with 90% power and a significance level of 0.05 based on data and intra-cluster correlations from the 2005 Rwandan DHS data in rural areas.
Two percent of sampled households refused to participate in the interview. In the followup survey, 88 percent of the baseline households were re-interviewed. The rate of attrition from the baseline sample was not statistically different between the treatment and comparison groups (12 percent each). Households that could not be found or interviewed were replaced with randomly selected households from the same zones.
Outcome Measures
Maternal health services: The outcomes include one indicator variable for any prenatal care utilization, one for completing 4+ prenatal care visits, and one for institutional delivery.
Quality of prenatal care:
We assess the quality of prenatal care delivered by computing the share of clinical content items that should compose a typical first prenatal consultation, as recommended in the Rwandan clinical practice guidelines for prenatal care, to the actual clinical content items delivered during a prenatal care consultation. 18 This measure has been used extensively in the literature to measure quality. [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] The items in the measure cover medical history questions, physical examinations, lab tests and follow-up procedures (Box 3). The
Cronbach alpha scale of reliability for the 38 item score is 0.78, indicating satisfactory internal consistency. In the impact analysis, we standardize the score by subtracting out the baseline mean and dividing by the baseline standard deviation. The unit of measurement is interpreted as standard deviations in quality.
The prenatal quality score was computed at the individual patient level using two samples. First, enumerators interviewed women who visited the facility as they exited the facility. Second, the same information was collected in the household survey from women who gave birth in the last 18 months and received prenatal care from the facility in whose catchment area they lived. In the analysis, we combined the exit interview and household survey data for first prenatal care visits to assess the impact of P4P on prenatal care quality, and we control for the observation's source in the analysis with an indicator variable for whether the observation was from the exit interview or household survey.
In addition to the prenatal care process quality index, we measure whether women dropped from the analysis.
Statistical Methods
As a result of the reassignment of some districts, we view the evaluation design as quasiexperimental and use difference-in-differences to estimate program impact. This method We estimate a multivariate regression specification of the difference-in-difference model where an individual's outcome is regressed against a dummy variable indicating whether the facility was receiving P4P that year, an individual fixed effect, a year indicator, and a series of individual and household characteristics. We compute robust standard errors clustered at the district by year level to correct for correlation of the error terms across facilities within districts.
The models were estimated using Stata version 10.
Covariates
In all of the estimated models, we control for the number of family members, the number of family members under six years old, family assets, the distance of the household from the facility, and whether the family is enrolled in health insurance. Assets are measured as the value of owned houses, durables in the house, farm animals, farm equipment and microenterprise equipment. We also include a variable for if the household owned land. In the prenatal care and delivery analyses, we also control for maternal years of schooling, marital status, whether the partner currently lives in the household, the number of prior pregnancies, and age defined in years. In the prenatal care quality analysis, we also include a variable indicating whether the observation was from the facility exit interview or household survey. In the children's utilization and outcomes analyses, we include controls for whether the mother and father currently live in the household, their age and years of schooling, the child's age and sex.
Ethical Review
This study was designed and implemented while Gertler was at the World Bank.
Although the World Bank does not have an Institutional Review Board, the study team submitted the research protocol to the Rwanda National Ethics Committee, which approved the research design, methodology and methods for informed consent.
RESULTS
We confirm that the evaluation design achieved balance at baseline of observed facility characteristics between the treatment and comparison groups. Table 1 reports the baseline means of facility characteristics in 2006. We find no significant differences between the treatment and comparison groups in terms of log expenditures, allocation of the budget across medical personnel, medical supplies and non-medical purposes, and the numbers of physicians, nurses and other types of personnel.
In the second row of Table 1 , we report the mean 2008 log expenditures for treatment and comparison facilities and find no statistically significant difference in the means after the introduction of P4P in the treatment facilities. This confirms that the program compensated the comparison facilities with an increase in their traditional budget equal to the increase in treatment facilities' resources and validates the interpretation of any estimated impacts being caused by in the introduction of P4P incentives, as opposed to an increase in resources.
Maternal Health Services
Our sample consists of women who gave birth in the 18 months prior to the survey: 620 treatments and 670 comparisons. We find no statistical differences in baseline means of the control and outcome variables used in the regression models, except for the share of women who completed 4 prenatal care visits (Table 2a) care. There appears to be no impact of P4P on the probability of any prenatal care or on the probability of completing 4+ visits. However, we estimate a statistically significant impact on the probability of institutional delivery of 0.074, with a 95 percent confidence region of (0.004, 0.143), which represents a 21 percent increase from baseline. We also find significant impacts on the quality of prenatal care. We estimate that the impact on the probability of receiving a tetanus vaccine is 0.054 (0.007, 0.265), which is a 7.6 percent increase from the baseline. We also estimate an increase of 0.14 (0.015, 0.265) standard deviations in the standardized prenatal quality score.
Child Health Services
The sample includes children 0-59 months at the time of the survey, and is well balanced between the treatment and comparison groups in terms of baseline control and outcome used in the regression analysis (Table 3) . On average across the sample, children 0-23 months old had 0.22 preventive visits in the 4 weeks prior to the survey. Children 24-59 months old living in treatment areas visited the health center 0.08 times in the last 4 weeks on average, while for those living in comparison areas visited 0.14 times, though the difference is not statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
We find large significant impacts of P4P on children's use of preventive health care (Table   4 ). We estimate that P4P increased the probability that a child 0-23 months visited a health center for preventive care by 0.134 (0.045, 0.224), which is a 64 percent increase over baseline.
Similarly, we estimate that P4P increased the probability that a child 24-59 months had a preventive visit by 0.106 (0.050, 0.111), which is a whopping 133 percent increase from the baseline probability for the treatment group. However, we did not find a significant effect on the probability that a child 12-23 months old was fully immunized.
DISCUSSION
We provide evidence that the incentives in the Rwandan P4P program are significantly associated with increased use and quality of a number of critical maternal and child health care
services, but not associated with others. These differences are probably related to the structure of the incentives. In general, we see a larger impact on services with higher incentives and for services that are more in the control of the provider and depend less on patients' decisions. For example, prenatal care quality and tetanus vaccination are completely in the provider's control whereas prenatal care visits depend on the mother deciding to come to the facility. At most, the provider can lobby the mother, but in the end the decision is hers.
Deliveries have the highest unit payment rate at $4.59. Providers reported they found deliveries to be so lucrative they not only encouraged women to deliver in the facility during prenatal care, but some also commissioned community health workers to conduct outreach in the community to find pregnant women to deliver in the facility.
Similarly, the large increase in preventive child visits is also explained by the higher payment rate. While the payment rate per child preventive visit is low at $0.18, the rate for finding a malnourished child and referring her for treatment is very high at $1.83. Given that almost 50 percent of children in Rwanda are stunted and could be referred, 12 approximately half of the child preventive growth monitoring visits yielded $0.18 each, while the other half yielded $2.01 each for the growth visit plus the identification and referral of a malnourished child.
One of the strongest monetary payoffs is for prenatal care quality. Specifically, every administration of tetanus vaccine and malaria prophylaxis yields $0.92, as well as increases the prenatal care quality index score. In addition, providers can use prenatal care visits to lobby women to deliver in the facility, a service for which they receive an additional $4.59. Finally, improved compliance with prenatal care clinical practice guidelines CPGs raises the facility's overall quality score and thereby the share of the P4P payments actually received.
The lack of impact on prenatal care utilization is also explained by poor financial incentives. The payment rate for the initial prenatal visit is very low at $0.09. Since over 95 percent of women at baseline made at least one visit, the $0.09 payment provides little incentive to find the few remaining women who do not use prenatal care. Second, the payment rate for completing 4 visits is only $0.37. Since women start prenatal care late in Rwanda (5 th or 6 th month) and have between 2 to 3 visits on average, it is difficult to complete additional visits in such a short period of time. Providers may not have wanted to expend the enormous effort necessary to get these women to come back for 1 to 2 more visits for only $0.37.
The fact that we did not find an impact of P4P on child vaccinations might be explained in part by the fact that baseline immunization rates were close to 65% and the government implemented an intensive national vaccination campaign starting in 2006. 26 
Policy Implications
Our findings illuminate the debate on some of the benefits and shortfalls of P4P. A number of specific P4P lessons also emerge from this study.
1. Higher payments provide high-powered incentives.
2. Incentives have a larger impact for services in which providers have more control, such as prenatal care quality. Therefore, higher incentive payments are warranted not only for services that are more important in terms of leading to better health outcomes, but also where more provider effort is required to improve those services.
Programs should consider paying more for verifiable clinical content indicators.
Content indicators are closely related to outcomes, are measurable, and are solely within the control of the provider.
4. For services that depend more on patient behavior, such as the decision to seek prenatal care, the program might provide financial incentives directly to the patient rather than the provider. Indeed, there is substantial evidence that conditional cash transfers to families increase preventive care utilization and improve health outcomes. [41] [42] [43] [44] [45] [46] [47] [48] [49] Another feasible alternative is to give community health workers an incentive to identify patients and encourage them to visit clinics.
One of the more important results of this analysis is the effect of P4P on the quality of care delivered. Although health workers may be competent to perform a medical procedure or consultation (i.e. prenatal care), they may not always be willing or motivated to expend the effort to perform all the required components of that procedure. 27, 28 By conditioning the Rwanda P4P
payment on a quality index score, the evidence suggests that the incentive gave providers the motivation to translate their knowledge about prenatal care into better practice. These results are important primarily because better quality care yields better health outcomes, and in the case of prenatal care this impacts both pregnant women and their children. 27, [29] [30] [31] [32] Indeed it is not enough to get mothers and children into care, it also matters that the care they receive is of high quality.
Limitations
There are a number of limitations to the study. First, the original randomized designed was revised due to the political decentralization process. While we can be confident in the results of the difference-in-differences analysis given that the sample is well balanced on observable characteristics and outcomes at baseline, this is one of the challenges for effectiveness studies in + Appropriate is defined to any woman who obtains her second, third, fourth or fifth tetanus shot.
++ Referrals must be confirmed by hospital that patient was treated and referral was necessary. * The β is the estimated treatment effect controlling for a year dummy, facility fixed effects, individual-level characteristics (age, education, number of children, civil status, presence of partner, health insurance) and household characteristics (number of household members, value of assets, land ownership and distance from the facility). Standard errors were adjusted for clustering at the health facility-year level.
** The β is the estimated treatment effect controlling for provider-level characteristics (age, gender, competency score), patient-level characteristics (age, education, civil status, insurance enrollment). Standard errors were adjusted for clustering at the health facility-year level. The number of observations in the tetanus model is less than in the quality score model because tetanus is only given to women with 5 pregnancies or less.
*** The β is the estimated treatment effect controlling for individual-level characteristics (age, gender, insurance enrollment), parental-level characteristics (mother/father present, age, education) and household characteristics (number of household members, value of assets, land ownership and distance from the facility). Standard errors were adjusted for clustering at the health facility level.
+ The % ∆ = (β / Baseline Mean) * 100, where the baseline mean of the dependent variable is the 2006 mean of the treatment group form Tables 2 and 3. 
